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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MICHAEL ALEXANDER,)
Appellant-Defendant,)
vs.) No. 71A03-0702-CR-81
STATE OF INDIANA,)
Appellee-Plaintiff.))

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Roland W. Chamblee, Judge Cause No. 71D08-0607-FC-227

August 30, 2007

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge

Case Summary

Michael Alexander appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle after a lifetime suspension of driving privileges, a class C felony. We affirm.

Issue

Alexander questions whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

On the afternoon of July 26, 2006, South Bend police officer Paul Strabavy was driving north on St. Joseph Street. He saw Alexander, sitting in a car at a stop sign on Milton Street. After Officer Strabavy passed the car, he looked in his rear view mirror and observed Alexander making a turn without signaling. Alexander then parked along the street and exited the car.

Officer Strabavy immediately drove back to the car and approached Alexander, who was standing in the middle of the street, talking with his friend Vernon Taylor. The officer asked both men for their identification. When he entered Alexander's information into his computer, he discovered that Alexander was a habitual traffic violator. Officer Strabavy cited Alexander for unsafe movement and arrested him. On July 27, 2006, the State charged Alexander with operating a motor vehicle after lifetime suspension of his driving privileges, a class C felony. At trial, Officer Strabavy testified to the foregoing version of events. Taylor testified that Alexander had arrived with a woman at least sixteen to twenty minutes before Officer Strabavy arrived. On December 19, 2006, a jury found Alexander guilty as charged, and he now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Alexander argues that Officer Strabavy and Taylor "could not both be believed by the jury." Appellant's Br. at 5. Because "[t]here was no evidence adduced that Mr. Taylor was lying[,]" Alexander contends that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id*. Alexander is correct that the two versions of events could not be reconciled. As is the jury's province, however, they chose to believe Officer Strabavy and not Taylor.

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses. *Holeton v. State*, 853 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Rather, we look to the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. *Id.* If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict, and if the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will remain undisturbed. *Id.* "[I]t is for the trier of fact to reject a defendant's version of what happened, to determine all inferences arising from the evidence, and to decide which witnesses to believe." *Id.*

The jury was free to disbelieve Taylor's version of events. The testimony of Officer Strabavy could have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that Alexander was driving a car on July 27, 2006, after his driving privileges had been suspended for life.

Affirmed.

DARDEN, J., and MAY, J., concur.